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ABSTRACT: The insurgent organisation called Islamic State (IS) has changed the paradigm of the 
territorial statehood, by threatening the concept of Westphalian and international legal sovereignty. 
IS’s medieval caliphate territorial project is based on a powerful anti-secular interpretation of the 
sovereignty. IS’s interpretation of the sovereignty is inspired by Sayyid Qutb’s thought, who said 
the Western concept of sovereignty is in contrast with Islam. State actors generally accept sove-
reignty, according to the English School of International Relations, as one of the systemic principles 
of order, defined as “primary institutions.” Consequently, Qutbist statehood represents an ideologi-
cal challenge to these ideas.
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LA ESTATALIDAD QUTBISTA DEL ESTADO ISLÁMICO: UNA AMENAZA SISTÉMICA 
PARA EL CONCEPTO DE SOBERANÍA COMO INSTITUCIÓN PRIMARIA DE LA 
ESCUELA INGLESA DE RELACIONES INTERNACIONALES
RESUMEN: La organización insurgente denominada Estado Islámico (EI) ha cambiado el para-
digma de la condición de Estado territorial, con la amenaza al concepto de soberanía legal inter-
nacional y westfaliana. El proyecto territorial de califato medieval de EI se basa en una poderosa 
interpretación antisecular de la soberanía. La interpretación de la soberanía de EI se inspira en el 
pensamiento de Said Qutb, quien dijo que el concepto occidental de la soberanía está en contraste 
con el Islam. Los actores estatales generalmente aceptan la soberanía, de acuerdo con la Escuela 
inglesa de las Relaciones Internacionales, como unos de los principios sistémicos de orden, que 
se definen como “instituciones primarias.” Por consiguiente, la estatalidad Qutbist representa un 
desafío ideológico para estas ideas.
PALABRAS CLAVE: Estado islámico, califato, soberanía, Qutb, Escuela inglesa, institución pri-
maria.
LE STATUT D’ETAT QUTBIST DE L’ÉTAT ISLAMIQUE: UNE MENACE SYSTEMIQUE 
POUR LE CONCEPT DE SOUVERAINETE COMME INSTITUTION PRINCIPALE DE 
L’ÉCOLE ANGLAISE DES RELATIONS INTERNATIONALES
RÉSUMÉ : L’organisation d’insurgés appelée Etat islamique (EI) a changé le paradigme de l’Etat 
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territorial, en menaçant le concept de la souveraineté juridique internationale et de la Westphalien. 
Le projet territorial du khalifat médiéval de l’EI est basé sur une puissante interprétation anti-laïque 
de la souveraineté. L’interprétation de la souveraineté de l’EI est inspirée par la pensée de Sayyid 
Qutb, qui a déclaré que le concept occidental de la souveraineté est en contraste avec l’islam. 
Les acteurs étatiques acceptent généralement la souveraineté, selon l’École anglaise des relations 
internationales, en tant que principes systémiques de l’ordre, défini comme une des «institutions 
primaires.» Par conséquent, l’Etat Qutbiste représente un défi idéologique à ces idées.
MOTS-CLES: État islamique, khalifat, souveraineté, Qutb, École anglaise, institution principale.
NOTES ON TEXT
Given that transcription from an alphabet other than the Latin one, such 
as Arabic always seems to be a task complicated by the responsibility to res-
pect as far as possible the original phonetics and pronunciation, the decision 
was made to retain the original terms in their Latin script where available, 
and diacritics were not used in order to prioritise an easier reading, following 
Vercellin’s lead.2 
Moreover, where appropriate, the Romanised version of  some names or 
concepts is used, if  they are better known than by their original language.3
Usually, an English translation of  the original Arabic term is avoided if  
a Romanised Arabic word has already entered the sphere of  knowledge of  
the general public (e.g. jihad rather than ‘holy war’, sharia rather than ‘Islamic 
law’) or when it expresses, in Arabic, general concepts which would not be 
better explained by translating (e.g. umma by community of  Muslim belie-
vers). However, English equivalent terms were used to prevent this study 
from transmitting a sense of  exoticism or exceptionality regarding religious 
doctrinal issues related to Islam (for example, Allah will not be used in place 
of  God).4
Furthermore, in terms of  pronunciation, it should be noted that the ar-
ticle / al / will always be used and transcribed, despite the fact that often, 
depending on the following word or name, the sound of  the / l / is lost and 
2 vercellin, G., Instituciones del Mundo Musulmán. Barcelona: Bellaterra, 2003, p. 23.
3 Ibidem.
4 Gómez García, L., Diccionario de islam e islamismo. Madrid: Espasa, 2009, pp. XV-XVII.
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the initial consonant sound of  the following word is doubled by the shadda on 
the following ‘sun’ letters.5
In addition, a separate transcription will be preferred to see the corres-
pondence of  each word translated. No contraction will be made, in order to 
allow a correct pronunciation of  all the phonemes, unless in determined cir-
cumstances a contraction would be preferred in order to allow easier reading 
(e.g. the preposition / bi / [by] will be contracted with the following article / 
al / to form / bil /).6
Then, despite being in Arabic a case system adopted at the ends of  the 
words to indicate the words’ grammatical function, the transcription will only 
be in the nominative case.
Finally, the Arabic words in their original transcript will always be in their 
singular form, unless indicated otherwise.
I. INTRODUCTION
The emergence and spread of  powerful sub-state or extra-state agents, 
such as organised criminal gangs, illegal cartels and insurgent entities with 
ideologies that claim to be universal in scope, contributes to the erosion of  
state sovereignty around the world, as Bull stresses.7
The most violent political dimension of  religious movements, such as the 
jihadism promoted by the so-called Islamic State (IS, Al-Dawla al-Islamiya in 
Arabic), is one of  the best examples of  the challenges the state authorities 
are facing.
In 2014, IS destroyed the Syria-Iraq border, declaring the medieval cali-
phate, a political entity unwilling to coexist with others.
Having observed that, after the rise of  the insurgency of  the IS, analysts, 
scholars, and media warned about the threat this organisation represented, 
5 For more information, see Ferrando, i, alonSo, a., Diccionario Pocket, Árabe-Español/
Español-Árabe, Barcelona: Herder Editorial, 2006; el-maSry, C., Al-Jatua. Iniciación a la lengua 
árabe. Madrid: UNED Estudios, 2008, pp. 52; 64-65.
6 FaSla, D., “La adaptación del étimo árabe [al-]habaqa (> albahaca, esp.) al sistema mor-
fonológico del íbero-románico.” Revista de investigación lingüística. N. 1 – Vol. III. Logroño: 
Universidad de la Rioja, 2000, pp. 69–89; Saad, M., “Estudio contrastivo de la asimilación 
consonántica en español y árabe.” Anaquel de estudios árabes, vol. 13. Madrid: UCM, 2002, pp. 
87-108.
7 See Bull, H., The Anarchical Society: a study of  order in world politics. London: Macmillan, 1977. 
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the question on whether IS rejection of  the national borders represents a 
threat and in which extent, popped up. To answer this question, it would be 
necessary to understand what borders mean to IS and which theoretical bases 
support its actions.
Borders are the most visible feature of  the existence of  an independent 
state, a denominated sovereign one. The English School (ES) of  International 
Relations (IR) describes sovereignty mainly in the same way it is perceived in 
international relations system, that is, as a fundamental idea and concept. Its 
shared acceptance has strong outcomes in international reality. Consequently, 
this analysis focuses on IS statehood ideology and its effect on sovereignty, as 
the ES conceptualises it.
Studying the doctrine on which IS bases its actions is vital to analyse how 
the decline and annihilation of  the Western nation-state role –whose origin 
is placed in the system which arose from the Westphalian peace treaties) and 
which the insurgent organisation promotes– affects not only the internatio-
nal security but also the very rules of  the international community of  states, 
as put forward by the ES of  IR, which calls them ‘primary institutions.’8
From the point of  view of  the Qutbist theory, we can understand how 
IS reads its effort towards the territorial construction of  the caliphate. Sayyid 
Qutb’s state theory, even today, serves as a doctrinal basis for approaching 
the sovereignty by the most prominent jihadist movements and insurgent 
organisations.9
Then, analysing the conceptualisations of  sovereignty used in the ES’s 
theory, as a primary institution, we can see how IS actions, based on Qutb’s 
views, change the paradigm of  the statehood sovereignty, a feature traditio-
nally linked to the territory.
As a consequence, a strong impact of  the qutbism could be perceived on 
the legitimacy of  sovereignty as a security value of  the international system. 
II. THE INSURGENCY OF ISLAMIC STATE
IS has mainly three lines of  action: 1) military, it is an insurgency and 
utilises traditional and terrorist tactics to win a war; 2) politically, it is an orga-
nisation and utilises terrorism as a mean of  pressure to obtain political gains; 
8 PaneBianco, A., Relazioni Internazionali. Milano: Jaca Book, 1992, pp. 41-56.
9 QutB, S., Milestones. Islamic Book Service, 2006.
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3) doctrinally, it is inspired by an ideology and grounds its actions on a radical 
interpretation of  a corpus of  religious beliefs.
The political outcome of  IS doctrinal dimension is its attempt to struc-
ture a model of  the state that take the form of  a medieval Islamic caliphate, 
which, according to an Islamic political radical interpretation, would under-
mine the legitimacy of  established and recognised governments.
Traditionally, those insurgent groups that pressure the state seek to access 
power (government bodies) following two patterns of  behaviour: 
1) by their inclusion in the institutions occupied by government autho-
rities and, therefore, their co-optation by the governmental process 
(through gathering and sharing of  power, or going public and find a 
legal acceptation to participate in the elective processes); 
2) by their physical separation from the pre-established states (through 
creating new institutions to govern a set territory and its population, 
i.e., becoming a new state authority).10
However, IS approach to insurgency looks based on Qutb’s state theory: 
the state entity that IS pretends to build is not only an alternative to the exis-
ting ones but –as it is defined as an Islamic caliphate– it has also acquired a 
symbolic value that transcends the physical, territorial dimension.
III. THE ORIGIN OF THE CALIPHATE: THEOCRACY SOUGHT
The Koran (Quran in Arabic11) and the Sunnah (the “habit” or “usual 
practice,” ways of  living, following Prophet Mohammad’s examples, legally 
relevant for the Muslim community) barely mention how the community of  
Muslim believers (umma in Arabic) should be organised, both politically and 
socially. Interpretations of  the management of  the umma have been making 
since the dawn of  Islam, but a definition of  Islamic statehood is hard to find. 
The question of  the organisation of  political power in Islam arose soon 
after Mohammad died and led to the first divisions among the religious com-
munity he formed. Obviously, the term “Islamic State” (as now used by ra-
10 For a definition of  insurgency, see Jordán enamorado, J., “Delimitación Teórica de la 
Insurgencia: Concepto, Fines Y Medios.” GESI UGR. (06 September 2011). <http://www.
seguridadinternacional.es/?q=node/3>.
11 Literally “the recitation,” because at first it was transmitted verbally and recited from mem-
ory.
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dical, insurgent Islamists) was odd at the time, because the political concept 
of  the modern state was not introduced until the fifteenth and sixteenth 
centuries, when it also emerged in Europe, as Rosenthal says. The concept 
of  “dawla” (State) was simply used to indicate a period of  reign (as it often 
coincided with a ruling dynasty, it was used to define a dynasty or temporary 
dynastic regime, which dealt with the affairs of  government and took over 
the political functions of  the caliph). The expression Al-Dawla al-Islamiya (the 
Islamic state) was coined during the late 19th century in opposition to the 
Western nation-state, seen as the model of  the colonial powers. It has now 
begun to identify the government, or state as a government entity.12
Under Islam doctrine, the authority ultimately belongs only to the deity 
or God. The governors are wielders not of  the power to interpret it, but the 
duty to apply it, according to the primacy of  orthopraxis over orthodoxy.13 
In this view, God is the supreme sovereign, the only source of  authority that 
creates the Islamic law or sharia (sharia al-Allah, in Arabic, literally “pathway 
to be followed to God”) and, especially, confers sovereignty, because sharia 
legitimises territory. 
In other words, the Islamic caliphate is a reflection of  the laws issued by 
the deity, which regulate every dimension of  human life for ruling on the 
community of  believers.
As such, all powers belong to God. However, since God cannot exercise 
them in person or through a spokesman (it would be a direct theocracy), and 
since there is no direct envoy since the death of  the Prophet, historically the 
government of  the umma, or the executive power, has been exercised through 
intercession, by an intermediary of  God. The believers recognise him (should 
be a man) as the “vicar” of  the Prophet, or caliph (khilafa in Arabic), and, 
as such, pledge him loyalty (baya in Arabic)14 and accept him as a guide. The 
territory in which the vicar of  the Prophet expresses his authority is called ca-
12 roSenthal, F., “Dawla.” In The Encyclopedia of  Islam, New Edition, Volume II: C–G. Leiden 
and New York: BRILL. 1991, pp. 177-178.
13 Orthopraxis (way of  salvation/deification chosen by man) is an act of  faith. The concept 
was theorised by Panikkar, R. (L’Homme Qui Deviant Dieu, Paris: Aubier, 1969) as a third way 
between the doctrine that identifies faith with orthodoxy, which can lead to “dogmatism;” 
and the moral, which identifies faith with orthopoiesis, a behaviour which is defined as cor-
rect, which can lead to “moralism.”
14 Gómez García, L., Diccionario de Islam e Islamismo. Madrid: Espasa, 2009, p. 37.
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liphate, where he is the absolute ruler and supreme guide. As a consequence, 
his actions acquire a sacred value, as he rules over the umma according to the 
divine will, embedded in the precepts transmitted by Mohammad.15
The caliphate is the form of  political organisation that brings about the 
caliph’s actions and represents an area of   exercising of  political and, at the 
same time, religious power, being him the highest earthly authority for the 
entire Muslim community. As a result, his work aims to have a universal scope 
because it is the earthly expression of  the divine design.16
According to Islam, God’s will has been conveyed through the sharia, as 
has been channelled by the Prophet in the Koran, together with the teachings 
and sayings of  his own life ( plural of  hadith in Arabic) (ibid., 125), collected 
in the Sunnah. According to tradition, in the caliph’s figure the two dimen-
sions of  the organisation of  human life converge: the secular and religious 
ones (dunya wa din in Arabic, literally the world [Earth] and the faith), i.e. the 
function of  spiritual guide (imam) of  the umma; and the functions of  political 
control (imar) of  the “state” (ibid., 89).
During the 10th and 11th centuries, the constituent elements of  the cali-
phate were theorised, thanks to the jurist Abou Al-Mawardi (974-1058 AD), 
who formulated the obligations of  the caliph.17
In his masterpiece, as reported by Gómez G., The Ordinances of  Government 
(Al-Ahkam al-Sultaniya), he established some principles for the development 
of  an Islamic political theory: 1) All sovereignty, power and authority ultima-
tely belongs to God; 2) Equality of  believers who accept the sharia; 3) The 
community of  believers is the only social and political body; 4) This commu-
nity or umma is governed by a single ruler whose mission is to protect it and 
ensure compliance with the rules of  sharia; 5) Armed defence of  the umma is 
an individual responsibility for all Muslims.18
15 vercellin, G., Instituciones del Mundo Musulmán. Barcelona: Bellaterra, 2003, p. 318-321.
16 Gómez García, L., Diccionario de Islam e Islamismo... cit, pp. 50-52.
17 Jordán enamorado, J., “Las Raíces Doctrinales del Terrorismo Yihadista.” Safe Demo-
cracy Foundation. (03 July 2006). <http://spanish.safe-democracy.org/2006/07/03/las-rai-
ces-doctrinales-del-terrorismo-yi/>; lano, A., “Sventola Bandiera Nera.” Rivista Missioni 
Consolata, (January/February 2015). <http://sfogliabile.rivistamissioniconsolata.it/2015/
MC_01_2015/index.html#34, pp. 35-45>.
18 Gómez García, L., Diccionario de Islam e Islamismo... cit, pp. 50-52..
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IV. THE SOVEREIGNTY OF THE CALIPHATE
Authors coincide in stating that, according to the interpretation of  the Is-
lamic political doctrine, the Islamic state’s sovereignty is extra-territorial, as it 
resides in God, the only legislator, who delegated his authority to Mohammad 
and, via him, to the caliphs; so it is a doctrinal matter.19
The caliph’s earthly power’s source is its divine inspiration, this meaning 
that the management of  the mundanity is an expression of  God’s authority.
As the supreme religious authority, the caliph has the duty to guide the 
action of  the Islamic community according to the sharia and to defend Is-
lam from the threat posed by the existence of  lands ruled and populated by 
infidels. 
The Islamic state model, from which the source of  its authority comes, is 
a total and totalising system, and, as its political leader and in order to defend 
Islam and ensure its survival against corruption, the caliph may expand the 
territories of  the caliphate, via conquest, to its natural limits, or the territories 
where Islam is practised, which are established by God.
Part of  this power is reflected in the manipulation of  the borderlands 
of  the Land of  Islam (Dar al-Islam in Arabic, literally Hogar of  Peace, as no 
necessity of  war against infidels is present and Muslim community should 
live in harmony within it) to start a jihad against false Muslims o infidels; 
the Land of  Islam would be constantly expanding over Dar al-Kufr (Land of  
Disbelief/Heresy) and annihilating the Dar al-Garb (Land of  War, where it is 
possible and desirable to fight, as it is a territory governed by actors opposed 
to Islam or threatening it). The “lands of  heresy and war” are doctrinal con-
cepts to describe territory according to the presence or absence within them 
of  Muslims, that emerged from a subsequent interpretation of  Islam in the 
thirteenth century.20
According to this reading, since the territories located beyond the borders 
of  the caliphate or in its borderlands are not organised or governed by divine 
law, their authority and their very existence lack legitimacy and are potentially 
lands of  conquest.
19 Samaan, J-L., “An End-of-Time Utopia: Understanding the Narrative of  the Islamic 
State.” NDC Research Report, Research Division, NATO Defense College. (31 August 2015). 
<http://www.ndc.nato.int/download/downloads.php?icode=448, pp. 3-6>.
20 Gómez García, L., Diccionario de Islam e Islamismo... cit., p. 187.
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Theoretically, these territories could also opt for a peaceful coexistence, 
or an armed peace, with Dar al-Islam.
However, as IS slogan states, the priority is “remaining and expanding” 
(baqiya wa tatamaddad in Arabic)21, therefore conquering, occupying and gover-
ning a territory, as a basis for further expansion.
In fact, the proclamation of  the restructuring of  the Islamic caliphate on 
29 June 2014 did not mean for IS the cessation of  its offensive.
The “caliphate” declared in the ancient Mesopotamian territory has not 
boundaries, supposedly coinciding with the ceilings of  their progress, nor 
have been defined as “caliphate” the whole territory constituted by the Anbar 
province in Iraq and the Yiazirah province in Syria, where IS installed. They 
have been renamed as administrative local unities (“provinces” or Wilaya in 
Arabic) of  the Caliphate, that is read according to its doctrinal meaning, as a 
“world government” of  Islam, an ecumenical organisation.
By taking this logic to its extreme consequences, every individual and/
or community that ignores or rejects this reality lacks legitimacy because it is 
not governed by the sharia and is, as a consequence, placed at a lower level 
to the caliphate.
Dogmatically, the membership of  (or the exclusion from) a religious 
community (whose limits are set by the requirement of  obedience to reli-
gious beliefs) gives a certain degree of  moral superiority and the (legal) right 
to (legitimately) survive to the state in which the community is personified.
As Lozano argues, the caliphate can define itself  as legitimate while den-
ying other communities’ existence and statehood status.22 As such, it claims a 
sui generis sovereignty.
V. QUTBIST STATE THEORY
The reading that IS makes of  the restructuring process, territorial expan-
sion and construction of  the caliphate is part of  the tradition of  the jihadist 
21 Warrick, J., et al., “The Rise of  ISIS: ‘Remaining and Expanding’,” The Washington Institute 
Policy Watch 2522. (12 November 2015). <http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analy-
sis/view/the-rise-of-isis-remaining-and-expanding>.
22 lozano Bielat, H., “Islamic State and the Hypocrisy of  Sovereignty.” E-International 
Relations. (20 March 2015). <http://www.e-ir.info/2015/03/20/islamic-state-and-the-hy-
pocrisy-of-sovereignty/>. 
Islamic State’s Qutbist Statehood: a Systemic Threat to the Concept of  Sovereignty as a Primary Institution in the 
English School of  International Relations
Paix et Securité Internationales
ISSN 2341-0868, Num. 5, janvier-décembre 2017, pp. 181-198190
interpretation of  the concept of  sovereignty, released as from 1964 by the 
Egyptian Sayyid Qutb, a member of  the Muslim Brotherhood, who was ins-
pired by a neo-Wahhabi ideology.23
In the eighteenth century, Wahhab was the ideologue of  the Al-Saud fa-
mily, later the royal dynasty of  Arabia, and one of  the instigators of  fun-
damentalist Islamic thought, who utilised the teachings of  Taqi al-Din Ibn 
Taymiyyah, a scholar from the fourteenth century (1268-1326). Taymiyyah 
advocated a return to a pure reading of  the Koran in order to avoid the rule 
of  jahiliyya24 over the Islamic community and to defend it against the false 
Muslims who threatened it (in Taymiyyah’s time, the enemies of  the Islam 
were represented by the Mongols, who were expanding throughout Asia and 
westward).25
Jahiliyya is an ideological derivation of  the principle of  the tawhid (i.e. the 
oneness of  God, that is, God’s indivisibility with the world). Accepting the 
oneness of  God brings to the absolute understanding of  the sovereignty of  
God over the universe or hakimiyya, a concept developed by Taymiyyah, later 
turned in a pillar for some Islamic doctrine’s radical views.26
In Milestones (Maalim fi al-Tariq in Arabic), Qutb advocated the transfor-
mation from the recognition of  the hakimiyya (sovereignty of  God) to the 
installation of  the rububiyya or “dominion of  God.”27 The recognition of  
sovereignty, read as a characteristic of  God as the absolute and universal 
supreme entity whom power extended all over the whole universe, results in 
23 QutB, S., Milestones. Islamic Book Service, 2006.
24 In the sense of  ignorance. Literally, this term describes the pre-Islamic age, as a period of  
ignorance and paganism.
25 Gómez García, L., Diccionario de Islam e Islamismo... cit., pp. 128-129; pp. 167-169.
26 It was also him who theorised the concepts of  Dar al-Islam and Dar al-Gharb in the 13th 
century since neither the Koran nor Mohammad’s ahadits made reference to this doctrinal 
conception; zahid, F., “Analysis of  the Influence of  Sayyid Qutb’s Islamist Ideology on the 
Development of  Djihadism.” Centre Français De Recherche Sur Le Renseignement Foreign 
Analysis, no. 8. (01 September 2014): 1-5. <http://www.cf2r.org/images/stories/foreign_
analyzes/fa-8.pdf>, p. 2.
27 Milestones was Qutb’s “manifesto.” However some elements of  Qutbism are found in his 
work Social Justice in Islam (Al-Adalah al-Ijtima’iyah fil-Islam in Arabic), and his Quranic com-
mentary In the Shade of  the Qur’an (Fi Zilal al-Koran in Arabic).
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the exercising of  this supremacy, explained with the concept of  “dominion,” 
i.e., the omnipotence of  God, his power and authority in all aspects of  life.28 
Wagemakers, in “Jihadi-Salafi views of  the Islamic State,” argued that, in 
Qutb’s view, the existence of  the Islamic State is a reflection of  the rububiyya, 
and its inexistence condemns society to a modern form of  jahiliyyah.29
As Wiktorowicz explains, modern jahiliyyah was theorised in 1939 by 
Abou Ala al-Mawdoudi (founder of  the Yamah al-Islamiya, an Indian version 
of  the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood) a non-Islamic situation where, as in 
pre-Islamic times, humanity was mired in ignorance. However, a modern jahi-
liyyah would be even worse, because in the modern age, after Mohammad’s 
revelation, the man should know the existence of  God, and every rejection 
of  Islam would be just unexcusable because it would be an explicit one.30 
According to this radical Salafi thinker, the world was plunged into jahiliyyah 
for trying to replace the authority of  God with the law of  men to rule over 
other men. Any individual or organisation, which claims sovereignty for itself, 
is pagan.31
For this reason, the idea of  the Western territorial nation-state is pagan, 
because it is contaminated by the concept of  the Westphalian sovereignty, 
which replace the authority of  God with the law of  men who, building bor-
ders, rule over other men.32 
VI. WESTERN SOVEREIGNTY.  
WESTPHALIAN AND INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SOVEREINGTY
28 Gómez García, L., Diccionario de Islam e Islamismo... cit., pp. 272-273.
29 According to WiktoroWicz, «Qutb read Al-Mawdoudi’s most influential works», in 
WiktoroWicz, Q., “A Genealogy of  Radical Islam.” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 28, no. 2. 
(20 August 2006), pp. 75-97,
30 ávileS Farré, J., “De la yihad clásica al terrorismo yihadí.” Revista de Historia Militar, nº 
extraordinario, Madrid: 2009.
31 zahid, F., “Analysis of  the Influence of  Sayed Qutb’s Islamist Ideology on the Develop-
ment of  Djihadism.” Centre Français De Recherche Sur Le Renseignement Foreign Analysis, 
no. 8. (01 September 2014): 1-5. <http://www.cf2r.org/images/stories/foreign_analyzes/
fa-8.pdf>, pp. 3; 5.
32 martín muñoz, G., El Estado árabe. Crisis de legitimidad y contestación islamista. Barcelona: 
Bellaterra, 1999.
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As doctrine promoted by IS seems to attack the Western conceptuali-
sation of  sovereignty, it is relevant to analyse it. A classic definition of  so-
vereignty is that of  an “externally [from other states] recognised right of  a 
political entity to exercise final authority over their own affairs.”
“Sovereign” means that the status of  a state entity is that of  an indepen-
dent political community. In this sense, sovereign states are what are generally 
recognised as such in a world of  independent states. Theoretically, sovereign-
ty grants equal treatment and conditions to state actors in the international 
system, despite any differences in size, extent, wealth and military capacity.33 
However, “sovereignty [remains] a complex concept with an unsatisfactory 
definition.”34 
Currently, “sovereignty” in IR is used mainly to indicate two interpreta-
tion of  the concept: the international legal sovereignty and the Westphalian 
sovereignty.
Both are relevant with respect to its importance towards the sovereignty 
doctrine promoted by IS and the purpose of  this study.
The former is described as a quality, that is, a characteristic of  the state, 
something which is given, an object of  the state. The latter stresses the sepa-
ration (independence) of  a territory-based political community from other 
states, which are excluded from the former domestic processes (no interven-
tion).
By convention, the birth of  the prevailing conception of  sovereignty, on 
which the modern Western territorial nation-state system is built, is placed 
after the signing of  the Treaties of  Peace of  Westphalia (1648), although 
some features had already been in existence before, and some aspects of  the 
medieval system would remain active in later periods.
33 hoSSain, K., State sovereignty and the UN charter. Oxford, 1964. Quoted in haSSan, D., “The 
Rise of  the Territorial State and The Treaty Of  Westphalia.” Yearbook of  New Zealand Juris-
prudence, Vol. 9. New Zealand: 2006; inayatullah, N., “Beyond the sovereignty dilemma: 
quasi-states as a social construct.” In BierSteker, T. J., and C. WeBer. State Sovereignty as Social 
Construct. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996, pp. 50-80.
34 craWFord, J., The Creation of  States in International Law. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2nd edition, 2006, p. 26.
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Caporaso sees the Peace of  Westphalia as one of  many steps that led to 
the so-called Westphalian system.35 The coexistence of  new sovereign states 
needed new rules which did not rely upon the doctrine of  the church or the 
interests that could hide behind it. When these principles were placed on a 
great secular power in an international treaty, such as the Peace of  Westphalia, 
the rulers were able to define their power with respect not only to the Papacy 
but also to other entities.36
Starting with Westphalia, there came a realisation of  what being an in-
dependent nation meant (based on three principles: rex est imperator in regno 
suo on exclusive power of  the ruler of  their kingdom; cuius regio, eius religio, 
eg., a 1555 Treaty of  Augsburg principle on the right to rule over religious 
issues without any external pressure; and the balance of  power, that is, formal 
recognition of  equality among state actors and need to maintain balance in 
distribution of  power internationally).
According to this Westphalian system, all “Westphalian” states were for-
mally recognised as being sovereign, i.e., they have the capacity to make in-
dependent decisions, which results in the exclusive exercising of  power (or 
ruling) over a given territory. Their borders were accepted by other states, and 
their population, living within and bounded by these borders, was subject to 
the authority of  their institutions.37
However, as the understanding of  modern sovereignty seems not to be 
resolved with a definition nor it is fully covered by the Westphalian principles, 
the second dimension of  sovereignty helps to best define it.
Indeed, it refers to what is usually understood by traditional sovereignty, 
that is, the act of  mutual recognition among independent, legally equal terri-
torial entities, created by cross-border relationships.
35 caPoraSo, J., Continuity and Change in the Westphalian Order. New York: John Wiley & Sons, 
Inc., 2000.
36 Gordon, K., The Origins of  Westphalian Sovereignty, Western Oregon University, (06 June 
2008), pp. 22-23.
37 cardozo de da Silva, E., “Teoría de las Relaciones Internacionales y Soberanía: Cons-
trucción, Deconstrucción y Reconstrucción.” Cuadernos Unimetanos, no. 11. (September 
2007), pp. 180-187.
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International legal sovereignty would be “an institution built through the 
actions of  states and granted by an act of  their representatives,” being a step 
further after the Westphalian “given” circumstances.38
VII. SOVEREIGNTY AND THE ENGLISH SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
Broadly speaking, the international legal sovereignty, which includes the 
Westphalian principles as previous, given factors characterising a phase of  a 
sovereignty-building, is the sense that the ES gives to sovereignty, to highli-
ght its importance as one of  the rules of  what the ES calls the international 
society.
With respect to the main argument of  this analysis, if  the sovereignty 
is, according to the ES, not only a quality given by the state, but also a fea-
ture created and granted by the international society and the relationships, 
customs and beliefs that exist within that society, the consequence is that 
the Islamic State’s ideology becomes a danger to the fundamental values  of  
sovereignty, as a pillar of  the international society, as Farer’s reading on the 
ES suggests.39
IS jihadist Salafism has successfully implemented, in the short term, the 
establishment of  the Caliphate/ Islamic state entity, which threats the legi-
timacy of  the dominant form of  statehood, the Western sovereign state-na-
tion, described by the ES as the primary institution of  international society 
(the “rules”), in order to replace it with a universal caliphate.
1. THE RULES OF THE GAME
A fundamental axiom of  the English School is that there is an order in the 
international system, thanks to the primary or fundamental institutions. The 
system is anarchic, but an international society runs on shared norms.
The ES uses the notion of  primary institutions of  international society as 
organisational ideas to describe norms of  coexistence conceived by systemic 
actors. The “Primary institutions” represent the pillars of  the dynamics of  
38 Ibidem.
39 kraSner, S., Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy. Cambridge: Princeton University Press, 1999, 
p. 46.
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international relations, or the principles (the “rules”) governing coexistence 
(the “game”), which warrant security. 
kraSner explains that the society of  states developed in the West, accor-
ding to that described by Bull, a prominent exponent of  the ES, has created 
a set of  rules and institutions that are able to ensure a certain level of  order 
among sovereign states (effective building of  an international society as a 
whole). Bull emphasises the importance of  being aware of  the rules, norms 
and institutions of  international society.40
This international society is visible precisely thanks to the ideas based on 
the key “institutions” on which the IR are based: war, the concept of  great 
powers, the balance of  power, the importance accorded to diplomacy and 
international law, and especially the principle of  mutual recognition of  state 
sovereignty.41
Sovereignty is explicitly cited as an example of a primary institution by 
Wilson. According to the English School, sovereignty is not only conceived 
as an intrinsic fact (Westphalian conceptualisation of sovereignty), but it is 
also seen as a basic idea of  international society to be mutually recognised 
(international legal sovereignty).42
2. IS’ CHALLENGE TO THE SOVEREIGNTY OF THE ENGLISH SCHOOL OF 
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
The legal status of  the Islamic State is challenging the operational mecha-
nisms of  the territorial nation-state. IS did not attempt to build a sovereign 
state and look for its acceptance by the international community (or socie-
ty, according to the view of  the ES); it actually rejects the very concept of  
40 The institutions ensure that rules and standards are met, not as a result of  calculation or 
coercion, but rather as a result of  belief  in, or of  being convinced of, its legitimacy. These 
“institutions” define membership and belonging to the international system of  those actors 
who abide by its rules and behave legitimately; Bull, H., The Anarchical Society: a study of  order 
in world politics. London: Macmillan, 1977.
41 alderSon, K., and A. hurrell (eds.), Hedley Bull on International Society. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1999.
42 WilSon, P., “Alternatives to realism: the English School of  International Rela-
tions.” paper presented at the Conference at the Johns Hopkins University, Bologna 
Institute for Policy research, SAIS Bologna Center, Italy. (28 February 2013), p. 2.
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the nation-state and its sovereignty, as the Western political science describe 
them.43
The building of  borders, artificial divisions that would separate Muslims, 
are the cornerstone of  the nation state that recognizes their existence and the 
principle of  their inviolability: Nielsen stressed that, for the jihadists of  the 
caliphate, these are the symbols of  the “infidel” West (kafir in Arabic) and 
their “apostate” allies (murtad in Arabic), acting against the supreme authority 
of  God, because they attempt to establish a secular sovereignty.44
In practice, using Mayall’s argument on the threat that the spread of  na-
tionalism represented for the international order in the 19th century,45 apart 
from IS threatening the territorial and institutional integrity of  at least two 
states (Syria and Iraq,), its denial of  the Western concept of  sovereignty, enu-
cleated from the Qutbist theory on the state, threatens that which the English 
School calls a “primary institution.”
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
IS has changed the security paradigm by threatening not only the military 
security of  the states and their populations but also the concept of  sove-
reignty. On one hand, the sovereignty according to the Western Westphalian 
tradition, as a foundation for the modern state and a base for structuring its 
personality statehood in front of  other similar actors, and on the other, as an 
institution and principle of  coexistence, defined as such by the ES.
In order to reach its political goals, the jihad of  IS, doctrinally based on 
qutbism, threatens the sovereignty as primary institution, as defined by the 
ES, by weakening the role of  the connection between territory and state. It 
disavows the concept of  secular sovereignty, changing the foundations of  
political legitimacy by attempting to move the exercising of  sovereign power 
43 caracciolo, L. and F. maronta, “Nella terza guerra mondiale noi italiani siamo in prima 
linea. Intervista a Pistelli.” In Caracciolo, L., et al., Le Maschere Del Califfo. Vol. 9. Roma: Grup-
po Editoriale L’Espresso, (09 September 2014), p. 35.
44 nielSen, R. A. (6 February 2015). “Does the Islamic State believe in sovereignty?” The 
Washington Post. <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2015/02/06/
does-the-islamic-state-believe-in-sovereignty/?utm_term=.e57975993eb8>.
45 mayall, J., Nationalism and International Society. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1990, pp. 26-28.
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from the people and the state authority to the “vicar” of  the envoy of  God, 
or the caliph.
Despite the lack of  external recognition, IS has promoted the structuring 
of  a territory, which has some statehood-related characteristics, as it controls 
a territory, rules over a population, provides services, manages resources, etc.
The jihadism, on which IS bases its development, has changed the me-
aning of  the concepts of  territoriality, borders, sovereignty and statehood. 
Indeed, various violent political actors, inspired by a certain interpretation 
of  a religious doctrine, have shown that their struggle’s aim is to be the basis 
of  a state which denies the legitimacy of  other states’ existences. As a conse-
quence, they introduce contradictions within the regulatory structure of  the 
international society and the meaning of  the primary institutions, according 
to the ES.
The concept of  the caliphate carried out by a jihadist view is opposed 
to the secular state sovereignty, but it takes into account the anchoring to a 
territory of  a certain religion-denominated community. It undermines so-
vereignty while claiming exclusivity in an “alternative” form of  sovereignty. 
The territory becomes a sacred object, not because of  its connection with the 
people, but due to their relationship with Islamic law. 
As a result, when they claim their “creations” to the international society, 
the jihadists from IS justify the construction of  the caliphate using a concept 
of  religious sovereignty, as a right granted by the will of  God, which is, by its 
nature, obligatory.
Qutb’s state theory inspires ideologically IS statehood process. Therefore, 
this process is not only a mere military and humanitarian threat to the state 
and citizenship security in those countries where it operates, but it represents 
also an ideological challenge to the concept of  state sovereignty, which accor-
ding to the English School of  International Relations, is a primary institution 
of  international society, then a pillar of  pacific coexistence. Therefore, the 
jihadist concept of  sovereignty represents a systemic threat.
Given that the threats to these institutions, as defined by the ES, are exis-
tential for the system for both units and for social order, IS jihadism, inspired 
by an anti-Westphalian qutbism, is a threat to the current structure of  the 
international system.
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